




Working Paper No. 07-02 
 
 














































Centre for Economic 




 Competing for Ownership
Patrick Legros†and Andrew F. Newman‡
May 2006 (revised May 2007)
Abstract
We develop a tractable model of the allocation of ownership and
control in ﬁrms in competitive markets that permits study of how the
scarcity of assets in the market translates into control allocations in-
side the organization. The model identiﬁes a price-like mechanism
whereby local liquidity or productivity shocks propagate and lead
to widespread organizational restructuring. Firms will be more in-
tegrated when the terms of trade are more favorable to the short side
of the market, when liquidity is unequally distributed among existing
ﬁrms and following a uniform increase in productivity. Shocks to the
ﬁrst two moments of the liquidity distribution have multiplier eects
on the corresponding moments of the distribution of ownership.
1 Introduction
In the neoclassical theory of the ﬁrm, market signals aect choices of prod-
ucts, factor mixes, and production techniques. If labor becomes scarce, wages
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1rise, and ﬁrms substitute machines for workers. Firm behavior, in turn, feeds
back to the market, and through it, to other ﬁr m s :i fal a b o r - s a v i n gp r o d u c -
tion process is introduced by some ﬁrms, wages will fall, and the other ﬁrms
will reduce the capital intensity of their production. The neoclassical ﬁrm
remains the backbone of much of economic analysis because it is so readily
incorporated into the study of feedback eects like these.
The modern theory of the ﬁrm emphasizes contractual frictions and orga-
nizational design elements such as monitoring technologies, task allocations,
asset ownership, and the assignment of authority and control. By augmenting
economic analysis with this new set of variables, it has led to breakthroughs
in our comprehension of institutions as dierent as the modern corporation
and the sharecropped farm. But despite the theory’s formative purpose —
to understand the nature of ﬁr m si nm a r k e te c o n o m i e s—a sw e l la se v i d e n c e
that ﬁrms restructure themselves in response to market conditions or the
behavior of other ﬁrms,1 there are few models that can take account of the
eects of the neoclassical feedbacks on the modern variables of interest.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple framework for this kind
of analysis. We focus on the structure of ownership and control, understood
here, as in Grossman and Hart (1986), as an allocation of residual decision
rights among a ﬁrm’s stakeholders.2 The model illuminates how scarcity in
the market translates into control inside the ﬁrm and how changes in the
fundamentals of some ﬁrms can spill over to economy-wide reorganizations.
The basic setup is a two-sided matching model, with the sides represent-
ing two types of production units, each one consisting of a manager and a
collection of assets. Firms comprising one unit of each type form through
1To mention just two examples, the wholesale restructuring of relations between US
automakers and their suppliers in the 1980s was likely triggered by entry of Japanese
ﬁrms into the US market; on a smaller scale, decision rights over the outﬁtting of truck
cabs or the accompaniment of drivers by their spouses during hauls have recently shifted
from trucking ﬁrms to their drivers in response to the growth of wages in the construction
industry.
2This distinguishes the present paper from earlier work such as Calvo and Wellisz (1978)
and Legros and Newman (1996), which focused on the general equilibrium determination
of monitoring and incentives. See also Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
2a competitive matching process that determines, for each matched pair, a
contract specifying its ownership structure.
After a ﬁrm has formed, a series of noncontractible management deci-
sions, one for each asset, has to be taken, after which output is realized and
the relationship ends. The organization must be designed to strike a compro-
mise between productivity (managers share the ﬁrm’s proﬁt) and the private
costs of managing, and because of the noncontractibility, this can only be
accomplished by a (re-)allocation of the rights to own or control the various
assets.3
In general the more assets a manager owns, the better o he will be,
since he will be able to ensure that more decisions go in his preferred direc-
tion. But because these decisions will impose both proﬁt and private cost
externalities on the other manager, dierent organizational designs generate
dierent levels of total surplus for the ﬁrm as well as dierent divisions of
that surplus between its managers.
A crucial attribute of the environment we analyze is that liquidity — in-
struments such as cash that can be transferred costlessly and without any
incentive distortions — is scarce. Managers have quasi-linear utility, so liquid-
ity transfers are the preferred means of reallocating surplus between them.
But when liquidity is in short supply, a large transfer of surplus will have to
be done through an organizational distortion, i.e., a reassignment of control.
This feature generates a key role for competitive analysis. The equilibrium
outcome can no longer be identiﬁed with the surplus-maximizing allocation of
ownership; instead, the market-determined division of the surplus is needed
to pin down the organizational outcome.
The model highlights two distinct eects that arise from a change in
fundamentals such as liquidity endowments or technology. The ﬁrst is an
“internal eect,” various forms of which have been studied in the literature
3The literature following Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) tends
to distinguish ownership from control by identifying ownership with a party’s right to
exclude others’ access to an asset, whereas control is applied to most other decisions
concerning its use. In the static environment without renegotiation we study here, there is
little meaningful distinction between these concepts, and we use the terms interchangeably.
3on ownership: the surplus that each partner obtains from a given contract is
a function of the characteristics of the partners in a relationship, in particular
the amount of liquidity they have and the production technology available.
Speciﬁcally, in our model, more liquidity in the ﬁrm enlarges the set of fea-
sible payos for the two managers by increasing transferability, though it
does not enlarge their set of production possibilities, since there is no need
to acquire productive assets from outside the partnership. Higher productiv-
ity not only enlarges the payo sets by expanding production possibilities,
but also increases transferability, because it induces managers to increase the
weight of proﬁt (which can be shared) relative to private cost (which cannot)
in their decisions. Hence, a positive shock to a ﬁrm’s liquidity or productiv-
ity will enable it to accomplish surplus division more e!ciently and reduce
organizational distortions.
B u tt h a ts a m es h o c kc a nh a v ew i d e re e c t st h a no nt h eﬁrm that ﬁrst
experiences it. The internal ee c ti m p l i e st h a tam a n a g e rh a se ectively a
higher “ability to pay” for a partner after a positive shock than before. He
may therefore bid up the terms of trade in the matching market: in order to
meet the new price, ﬁrms which have not beneﬁted from the shock will have to
restructure. Thus the shock may have an external eect: “local” shocks may
propagate via the market mechanism, leading to widespread reorganization.
The market equilibrium of our model turns out to be amenable to a Mar-
shallian supply-demand style of analysis, making the role of the external
eect especially transparent. Suppose for instance, that one side of the mar-
ket represents automobile manufacturers selling in the U.S. market and the
other side represents their suppliers. An increase in the number of manu-
facturers due to entry from abroad will reduce the share of surplus accruing
to the auto makers. This will entail a transfer of control to the suppliers,
and many manufacturer-supplier relationships will become less integrated in
the sense that a smaller fraction of the assets will be controlled by the auto
maker’s manager.
Furthermore, while the internal eects of positive shocks to liquidity and
technology are similar — they both decrease integration — the external eects
dier. A uniform increase in the liquidity level of all agents lowers the degree
4of integration in all ﬁrms (the internal eect dominates the external eect).
By contrast, a uniform shock to productivity increases the degree of inte-
g r a t i o ni na l lﬁrms (the external eect dominates the internal eect). These
eects can be quite pronounced: there is an “organizational multiplier” ef-
fect of shocks, with, for instance, a unit change in mean liquidity producing
a larger than unit change in the mean degree of integration. As we show in
Section 3, the model can also capture the eects of more complex changes in
the liquidity endowments or in productivity.
Our model of the determination of ownership structure is inspired by
Grossman and Hart (1986). However, we depart from their analysis in three
respects. First, as in Hart and Moore (1990), we allow for a richer set (in fact,
a continuum) of ownership structures rather than the two (integration and
non-integration) discussed by Grossman and Hart. This feature yields both
tractability for competitive analysis, and the ﬂexibility to capture the rich
array of control allocations displayed by real ﬁrms (for examples, see Lerner
and Merges, 1998 on biotechnology R&D alliances; Arruñada, Garicano, and
Vázquez, 2001 on automobile dealerships; and Blair and Lafontaine, 2005 on
fast food franchises). Second, as have a few recent papers (e.g. Hart and
Holmström, 2002; Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 2004; Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy, 2006), we abstract away from the hold up problem by drop-
ping ex-ante investments and assuming instead that ex-post decisions are not
contractible. Our purpose in doing so is to make the surplus transfer role of
ownership especially transparent: the set of feasible decisions is unaected
by who owns an asset, and therefore awarding ownership of more assets to
one manager unambiguously raises his payo.
The third and most important departure is the assumption that liquidity
is scarce. The corporate ﬁnance literature beginning with Aghion and Bolton
(1992) has already highlighted what we have termed the internal eect of
limited liquidity on the allocation of control: given the division of surplus,
raising a contractual party’s liquidity endowment will tend to give him more
control and increase the e!ciency of the relationship. What is new here is
the identiﬁcation and analysis of the external eect: limited liquidity implies
that a ﬁrm may modify its control right allocation, at a possible e!ciency
5cost, in response to changes in the liquidity (or technology) of another ﬁrm.
This eect would also be present for many other speciﬁc models of ownership
and organizational design: all that is important is that the payo frontier not
reﬂect transferable utility, which in our formulation scarce liquidity helps to
guarantee.
2M o d e l
We consider an economy in which there are two types of production units,
indexed by 1>2= Each unit consists of a risk-neutral manager and a collection
of assets that he will have to work with in order to produce. We have in
mind competitive outcomes, and so we suppose that there is a large number
of production units: each side of the market is a continuum with Lebesgue
measure. The type 1’s are represented by l 5 L =[ 0 >1] while the type 2’s
are represented by m 5 M =[ 0 >q]> where q?1; thus, the 2’s are relatively
scarce. We assume that production units may operate on a stand-alone basis,
in which case they earn an outside option (normalized to zero), or cooperate
in pairs comprising one unit of each type, in which case they can generate
strictly more than zero surplus.
Many interpretations are possible: the two types of manager might be
supplier and manufacturer, and the assets plant and equipment; a chain
restaurateur and franchising corporation (in which case some of the assets
m i g h tb er e p u t a t i o n a l ) ;o ra saﬁrm and its workforce, for which the assets
might be interpreted as tasks.
In an individual production unit, an asset’s contribution to proﬁtd e p e n d s
on a planning decision made by one of the managers, not necessarily the one
who will have to operate it. Planning decisions are not contractible, but the
right to make them can be allocated via contract to either manager. For
simplicity we assume that planning choices (e.g., choosing the background
music for a retail store) are costless. But while potentially beneﬁcial for
proﬁts (some music is likely to induce consumers to make impulse purchases),
those choices aect the private cost of later operations (such music may be
unpleasant for the store’s ﬂoor manager).
6The l-th type-1 manager will have at her disposal a quantity o1(l)  0 of
cash (or “liquidity”) which may be consumed at the end of the period and
which may be useful in contracting with managers of the opposite type; for
the type 2’s, the liquidity endowment is o2(m)= The indices l and m have been
chosen in order of increasing liquidity.
When discussing a generic production unit or its manager, we shall usually
drop the indices.
2.1 The Basic Organizational Design Problem
2.1.1 Technology and Preferences
Managers seek to maximize their expected income (including the initial liq-
uidity) less the private costs of operating the enterprise.
The collection of assets in the type-1 production unit is represented by a
continuum indexed by n 5 [0>1); the type-2 assets are indexed by n 5 [1>2).
An asset’s contribution to proﬁt is proportional to the planning level t(n)>
where t(n) 5 [0>1]=
Planning decisions contribute to the ﬁrm’s performance as follows. The
ﬁrm either succeeds, generating proﬁt UA0> with probability s(t); or it
fails, generating 0, with probability 1  s(t)> where t :[ 0 >2) $ [0>1] are the





where ?1@2 is a technological parameter. It is convenient to deﬁne D =
U=
Either manager is capable of making planning decisions. There is no cost
to making a plan, but there is a (private) operating cost to the manager who
subsequently works with an asset: the 1-manager bears cost f(t(n)) = 1
2t(n)
2
for n 5 [0>1)> and zero for n 5 [1>2]; similarly for 2, the cost is f(t(n)) on








7This is the cost externality we alluded to: the cost to the manager oper-
ating the asset is increasing in t(n), whether or not he has chosen it.4 For
instance in a manufacturing enterprise, t could index choices of possible parts
or material inputs, ordered by the value they contribute to the ﬁnal prod-
uct, while f(t) could represent the cost of managerial attention devoted to
overseeing assembly, supervising workers, and so on; we are supposing that
higher value inputs require greater eort on the part of the manufacturer’s
management.
2.1.2 Contracts
We have already made the following contractibility assumptions:
Assumption (i) The right to decide t(n) is both alienable and contractible.
(ii) The decisions t are never contractible.
(iii) The costs Fl(t) are private and noncontractible.
A contract ($>w) speciﬁes the allocation of ownership $ and liquidity
transfers w made from 1 to 2 before any planning or production takes place.
T h el i q u i d i t yl e v e l so ft h et w ot y p e sb e i n go1 and o2 respectively, we must have
w 5 [o2>o 1]= The ownership allocation $ is the fraction of assets re-assigned
to one of the managers. The type-1 manager owns assets in [0>1$)> where
1 ?$ 1> and the type-2 owns [1  $>2)=
4Note that we are assuming symmetry in the technology and cost between the two
managers; any dierence that emerges between the two sides will be only due to a dierence
in scarcity. One could extend the model to allow for asymmetries in cost, productivity
or initial number of assets. For instance, if F2  0> a ﬁrm is basically a principal-agent
model. If the type-2 is interpreted as "capital," the model could be viewed a static version
of a ﬁnancial contracting problem, like Aghion and Bolton (1992). Assuming that one type
is more productive that the other allows one to to ask the kind questions addressed by
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) concerning who should (as against
who does) own the assets. For some applications, e.g. ﬁrms and workers, it might be
appropriate to assume that one type (ﬁrms) initially owns and bears the cost from most
of the assets.
8Since we want to focus here on allocations of control rights, we will sim-
plify matters by ignoring the eects related to variations in the sharing of
proﬁts. Instead, we simply assume that each manager gets half of the real-
ized output, that is he gets U@2 if output is U and 0 if output is 0= This is
a simple representation of the constraints faced by real ﬁrms in the use of
incentive pay. Similar kinds of assumptions have been used elsewhere in the
literature (e.g., Hart, 1983; Holmström and Tirole, 1998), and in Appendix I,
we show that it can be derived as a consequence of a moral hazard problem.5
This leaves out a logical possibility:6 the managers might use a third
party “budget breaker” who will pay the ﬁrm if there is success and will be
paid out of the liquidity available in the ﬁrm if there is failure. Using third
p a r t i e si nt h i sw a ym a yi m p r o v ee !ciency, but only if the third party gets
more when the ﬁrm fails than when it succeeds. Apart from the undesirable
incentive problems this creates (the third party may want the ﬁrm to fail),
this modiﬁcation would not change the basic message of this paper.7
When $ =0 > each manager retains ownership of his original assets, and,
following the literature, we refer to this situation as non-integration.A s $
increases beyond 0> we have an increasing degree of integration (a growing
fraction of the assets are owned by 2)> until with $ =1we have full inte-
gration. (The symmetric cases with $?0 correspond to 1-ownership; with
scarce 2’s and zero outside options for the 1’s, $ will turn out to be posi-
5One can also relax the assumption and allow for a rich set of budget-balancing sharing
rules to yield predictions on the interplay between ownership allocations and proﬁts h a r e s .
The modiﬁed model of the ﬁrm can easily be embedded in our framework, leading to only
minor modiﬁcation of the results in Section 3. See Legros and Newman (2007).
6There are three others. First, that the managers “swap” assets: in additon to $> which
indicates how many of 1’s assets are shifted to 2, the contract would have an additional
variable # indicating how many of 2’s assets are shifted to 1. Second, that the managers
pledge their liquidity to increase the total revenue available after the output is realized.
Third that agents use external ﬁnance, i.e., sign debt contracts. We show in Appendix I
that none of these possibilities can improve on contracts as we deﬁne them.
7It would, however, make the analysis more complex; in particular, we would lose
the simple supply-demand analysis that we perform here. For an example of the use of
third parties in the formation of ﬁrms when there are liquidity constraints see Legros and
Newman (1996).
9tive in equilibrium, and we focus on this case in what follows unless noted
otherwise.) Since $ not only describes the ownership structure but also pro-
vides a scalar measure of the fraction owned by one party, we shall often refer
to its (absolute) value as the degree of integration of the ﬁrm.
2.1.3 The Feasible Set for a Firm
Given the incentive problems arising from contractual incompleteness, it
should come as no surprise that the ﬁrst-best solution (in which t(n)=D for
all n) cannot be attained. For tasks n 5 [0>1)> when manager 1 makes the
planning decision, he will underprovide t since he bears the full cost of the
decision but gets only half of the revenue beneﬁt. By contrast, if the plan is
made by manager 2, that manager will overprovide t since by increasing t>
expected output increases and 2 bears no cost.
Since the proﬁt shares are ﬁxed, without liquidity, the only remaining
way to allocate surplus is to modify the degree of integration $= Given a
contract ($>w) the two managers subsequently choose t noncooperatively to
maximize their corresponding objectives:


























It is straightforward to see that manager 1 will set t(n)=D
2 on the assets
n 5 [0>1  $) that he controls, and that manager 2 will choose t(n)=1for
n 5 [1  $>1) and t(n)=D




















10B e c a u s er e a l l o c a t i n gc o n t r o lr i g h t sd o e sn o ta ect the feasible set of planning
decisions, a manager gaining control of additional assets cannot be worse o.8
Proposition 1 A manager’s payo is nondecreasing in the fraction of assets
he controls.
Note that the Pareto frontier when there is no liquidity (so that w =0 )
and when y2  3D2@8 is
y2 =
½
y1 +(  +1 )3












where  =2 D@(2  D) ? 1 measures the degree of payo transferability.
Observe that the total surplus generated by a contract $> x1 ($>w)+x2 ($>w)>
is maximal at $ =0(nonintegration) provided
D?2@3= (4)
We shall focus on this case.9
When managers have no liquidity, w =0and as 1’s payo decreases, the
number of assets 2 owns (weakly) increases. At the same time total surplus is
decreasing; thus it is fair to say that here reallocations of ownership are used
to transfer surplus, not merely to generate it. Notice as well that this mode
of surplus transfer is less e!cient than transferring cash; thus any liquidity
that the managers have to spare will be used ﬁrst to meet the surplus division
demanded by the market before they transfer ownership.
When agents of types 1 and 2 have liquidity o1 and o2, the set of feasible
payos they can attain via contracting is deﬁned by (1) and (2), along with
uncontingent transfers that do not exceed the initial liquidities. Given the
risk neutrality of the managers, ex-ante transfers do not aect total surplus;
in particular we have x1 ($>w)=x1 ($>0)  w and x2 ($>w)=x2 ($>0) + w.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical feasible set when agents have liquidity o1 and o2=
8This invariance of the feasible set to transfers of control stems from the absence of
investments made before t is chosen; in particular it extends to cases in which there
are noncontractible investments ex post and/or in which sharing rules are ﬂexible. See
Legros-Newman (2007).
9When DA2@3> the frontier is non-concave, and, absent lotteries, the most e!cient
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Figure 1: Feasible Set
The dark segments represent the frontier in the absence of liquidity trans-
fers. The surplus maximum occurs at the kink, where $ =0 ;we have indi-
cated a point d on this frontier corresponding to a transfer $W of control to
2. Point e indicates the surplus levels to 1 and 2 after 1 also transfers all of
his liquidity o1; the gray segments trace the entire frontier available to this
pair of managers.
2.2 Market Equilibrium
Market equilibrium is a partition of the set of agents into coalitions that
share surplus on the Pareto frontier; the partition is stable in the sense that
no new ﬁrm could form and strictly improve the payos to its members. The
only coalitions that matter are singletons and pairs (which we call “ﬁrms”)
consisting of one type 1 production unit l 5 L and one type 2 production
unit m 5 M. Since there is excess supply of type 1 production units, there is
at least a measure 1  q of type 1 managers who do not ﬁnd a match and
who therefore obtain a surplus of zero. Stability requires that no unmatched
type 1 manager can bid up the surplus of a type-2 manager while getting a
12positive surplus. Necessary conditions for this are that all type 2 managers
are matched and that they have a surplus not smaller than x2 (0>0) = 3
8D2=
As is apparent from the construction of the feasible set, when y2 Ax 2 (0>0)>
payos on the Pareto frontier are achieved by transferring the liquidity of
type 1 only, that is, the 2’s liquidity does not matter. Thus all 2’s are
equally good as far as a 1 is concerned and they must therefore receive the
same surplus.10
This “equal treatment” property for the 2’s is an important simpliﬁcation
relative to most assignment models in which there is heterogeneity on both
sides of the market. Identify the set of ﬁrms I with the index of the type 1
manager in the ﬁrm “ﬁrm l” indicates that the ﬁrm consists of the l-th type
1 production unit and a type 2 manager.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium consists of a set of ﬁrms I  L with Lebesgue
measure q> a surplus yW
2 received by the type 2 managers, and a surplus func-
tion yW
1 (l) for type 1 managers such that:
(i) (feasibility) For all l 5 I> (yW
1 (l)>yW
2) 5 X (o1 (l)>0)= For all l@ 5 I>
yW
1 (l)=0 =
(ii) (stability) For all l 5 L>for all m 5 M> for all (y1>y 2) 5 X (o1 (l)>o 2 (m))>
either y1  yW
1 (l) or y2  yW
2=
2.2.1 Characterizing Market Equilibrium
Since the type-2 managers have the same equilibrium payo, we can reason in
a straightforward demand-and-supply style by analyzing a market in which
t h et r a d e dc o m m o d i t yi st h et y p e2 ’ s .W ec o n s t r u c tt h ed e m a n da sf o l l o w s .
The amount of surplus a 1 is willing and able to transfer to a 2 depends on
how much liquidity he has. The willingness to pay of type 1 is the value of
10If in ﬁrm (l>m) type 2 m has a strictly larger surplus than type 2 m0 in the ﬁrm (l0>m0)>
the ﬁrm (l>m0) could form and both l and m0 could be better o since the Pareto frontier
is strictly decreasing. Note that if the 1’s have large enough outside options (or are more
scarce than the 2’s), their liquidity does not matter, while the liquidity of 2’s does. It can





x1 ($>0)  w
w 5 [0>o 1]=
In the contract ($>w)> the type 1 manager gets x1 ($>w)+o1; the oppor-
tunity cost of the contract is to be unmatched and get o1; hence the manager
is willing to contract when x1 ($>w)  0 which is equivalent to the condi-
tion stated since x1 ($>w)=x1 ($>0)w= Simple computations show that the





























4D2  2o1 (l)
¢
D
23D + o1 (l) if o1 (l)  3
8D2 (6)
Since the frontier has slope magnitude less than unity above the 45-line, and
since o1 (l) is increasing in l> the willingness to pay of l is nondecreasing in
l= I ft y p e2a g e n t sm u s tg e tap a y o  of y2> the type 1 agents who are willing
and able to pay this price is
G(y2)=1 min{l 5 [0>1] : Z (l)  y2}=
The supply is vertical at q, the measure of 2’s. Equilibrium is at the inter-
section of the two curves: this indicates that q o ft h e1 ’ sa r em a t c h e d ,a s
claimed above, and that the marginal 1 is receiving zero surplus.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium set of ﬁrms is I =[ 1 q>1] and the equi-
librium surplus of type 2 managers is
y
W








where ¯ o1 = o1 (1  q)=
14n
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Figure 2: The Market for Ownership
If ¯ o1  3D2@8> e!ciency is obtained since each matched type 1 is able
to pay 3D2@8 to the type 2 manager; note that in this case the equilibrium
surplus of all type 1 managers is zero. We will consider below situations in
which ¯ o1 ? 3D2@8=






4D2= T h em a r g i n a lt y p e1m a n a g e r1  q has a surplus of 0> but the infra-
marginal type 1 managers with liquidity o1 A ¯ o1 will be able to generate a
positive surplus for themselves since they can transfer more liquidity than
the marginal type 1. The surplus of an inframarginal type 1 with liquidity
o1  ¯ o1 when the price is yW
2> it the value of the problem
max
$ x1 ($>w)+o1








































In this model, there is a piece-wise linear relationship between the liquidity,
the degree of integration $> the level of output and the managerial welfare.
The fact that the degree of integration is a globally convex and decreasing
function of liquidity and is an increasing function of the price yW
2 illustrates
the internal and external eects we alluded to. The eect of a higher level of
liquidity may be overcome by an increase in the price yW
2= Of course, the price
itself reﬂects the liquidity and the technology available in the economy. To
study the eects of shocks systematically, we must take account of the fact
that yW
2 itself is endogenous, which we do in the next section.
Lemma 3 The degree of integration $(yW
2>o 1) is piece-wise linear: it is linear
nondecreasing in yW
2> nonincreasing in o1 when o1 ?y W
2  3
8D2> it is equal to
zero when o1  yW
2  3
8D2=
3 Comparative Statics of Market Equilibrium
In equilibrium, there will typically be variation in organizational structure
across ﬁrms, and this is accounted for by variation in their characteristics.
In particular, “richer” ﬁrms are less integrated and generate greater surplus
for the managers.11
But more liquidity overall can also lead to more integration: if the mar-
ginal ﬁrm’s liquidity yW
2 rises, possibly by more than an inframarginal ﬁrm’s
gain in liquidity. As a result, the inframarginal ﬁrm may become more inte-
11Holmström and Milgrom (1994) emphasize a similar cross-sectional variation in orga-
nizational variables. In their model, the variation reﬂects dierences in technology but not
dierences in e!ciency relative to their potential, since all ﬁrms are surplus maximizing.
Here by contrast, the variation stems from dierences in liquidity and reﬂects dierences
in organizational e!ciency.
16grated, and indeed it is possible that the economy’s average level of integra-
tion may increase via this external eect.
We shall consider three types of shocks that may lead to reorganizations
in the economy: changes in the relative scarcity of the two types, changes in
the distribution of liquidity, and changes in the parameter D.
3.1 Relative Scarcity
In order to isolate the “external eect” our ﬁrst comparative statics exercise
involves changes in the tightness of the supplier market, i.e., in the relative
scarcities of 1’s and 2’s.
Suppose that the measure of 2’s increases, for instance from entry of
downstream producers into the domestic market from overseas. Then just
as in the standard textbook analysis, we represent this by a rightward shift
of the supply schedule: the price of 2’s decreases. Indeed, as q increases the
liquidity of the marginal type 1 decreases since o1 (1  q) is decreasing with
q= What of course is dierent from the standard textbook analysis is that
this change in price entails (widespread) corporate restructuring.
Let I (q) be the set of ﬁrms when there is a measure q of type 2 ﬁrms. As
q increases to ˆ q> there is an equilibrium set I (ˆ q) where I (q)  I (ˆ q);that
is after the increase in supply, new ﬁrms are created but we can consider
that previously matched managers stay together. The surplus of all type
1 managers in ﬁrms in I (q) increases. Managers in a ﬁrm in I (q) will
restructure (decrease $) in response to the reduction in the equilibrium value
of yW
2. The analysis is similar in the opposite direction: a decrease in the
measure of 2’s leads to an increase in yW
2= Thus, we have
Proposition 4 In response to an increase in the measure of 2’s, the ﬁrms
remaining in the market become less integrated.
It is worth remarking that if the relative scarcity changes so drastically
that the 2’s become more numerous, then 1’s get the preponderance of the
surplus and tend to become the owners; the analysis is similar to what we
have seen, with the role of 1’s and 2’s reversed. The point is that the owners
17of the integrated ﬁrm gain control because they are scarce, not because it is
e!cient for them to do so: in this sense, organizational power stems from
market power.
However, this story is heuristic: increases in demand for the type 1 most
likely emanate from entry of new ﬁrms (which in turn entails a change in the
liquidity distribution among the active ﬁrms) and from increases in produc-
tivity (e.g., “skill-biased technical change”). Thus, a general analysis of the
eects of changes in relative scarcity requires separate consideration of the
eects of changes in liquidity and productivity; we provide this in the next
two subsections.
3.2 Liquidity Shocks
Evaluating changes in the liquidity distribution is complicated by the inter-
play of the internal and external eects described above. The dependence of
the ownership structure $ on the type-1 liquidity o1 and the equilibrium sur-
plus yW
2 was summarized in Proposition 2 and Lemma 3. Equipped with this
result, we can derive some characterizations and simple comparative statics
of the distribution of ownership structures.
First, if one is interested in minimizing the degree of integration in the
economy (this maximizes the surplus), it is clear from (7), Proposition 2, and
Lemma 3 that one wants the marginal liquidity as low as possible, so as to
minimize the equilibrium price, and one wants to maximize the liquidity of
the inframarginal ﬁrms. Because the function $(yW
2>o 1) is globally convex in
o1>H[$] is minimal when all ﬁrms have the same level of liquidity; more gen-
erally, there is a simple description of the set of distributions that minimize
average integration in the economy.
Proposition 5 Let O be the average liquidity among the type 1 managers.
The degree of integration is minimized when the marginal type 1 has zero
liquidity and when the distribution of liquidity among the inframarginal type
1’s has support in [0>3D2@8] when O? 3D2@8 and support in [3D2@8>4)
when OA 3D2@8=
18We now consider how the distribution of ownership depends on the distri-
bution of liquidity. To simplify, we restrict attention to liquidity distributions
in which all type 1’s are liquidity constrained and belong to ﬁrms with a pos-
itive $= In the Appendix, we consider the general case in which a positive
measure of type 1’s are in decentralized ﬁrms.
Let J(o) be the distribution of liquidity among the type 1’s, ¯ o1 the mar-
ginal liquidity, and  = 1
q
R
{oD¯ o1} ogJ(o) and 2 = 1
q
R
{oD¯ o1} (o  )
2 gJ(o) be
the mean and variance of liquidity of the inframarginal type 1’s. The linearity
of the degree of integration in o implies a monotonic relationship between the
ﬁrst two moments of the distribution of liquidity and those of the distribution
of ownership when all ﬁrms choose integration.
Proposition 6 The mean and the variance of the degree of ownership are








The dependence of the mean degree of ownership on the liquidity of the
marginal type reﬂects the external eect, since a higher liquidity at the mar-
ginal relationship implies a higher degree of integration in other ﬁrms. When
all ﬁrms choose a positive $> t h ev a r i a n c eo f$ depends only on the variance
of liquidity. As we show in the Appendix, when there is a positive measure
of type 1 who are not liquidity constrained, the variance of ownership also
depends on the marginal and mean liquidities as well as the variance.
The average level and degree of heterogeneity in ownership structure is
sensitive to the distribution of liquidity. Since e is greater than 4, a unit
increase in the mean liquidity leads to a fourfold decrease in the average
level of integration; a unit increase in the variance of liquidity generates a
sixteen-fold increase in the variance of integration. We are not aware that
such a “multiplier eect” of fundamentals on organizational structure has
been previously noted in the literature.
Equipped with this proposition, it is easy to compare outcomes for two
distributions of liquidity J and K= Suppose that the marginal level of liquidity
19is larger at K than at J : J(¯ oJ
1 )=K(¯ oK
1 )=1q implies ¯ oJ
1 ? ¯ oK
1 = It follows
that the price of type 2 is greater with K than with J;i nf a c tf r o m( 6 ) ,
yWK
2 = yWJ
2 +( 1 )(¯ oK
1  ¯ oJ
1 ). Hence each type 1 who is inframarginal
with K uses a greater degree of integration than with J= However this is
not incompatible with a decrease in the average degree of integration if the
average liquidity increases enough: the internal eect must compensate for
the external eect. This is formally stated below.
Proposition 7 Consider two distributions of liquidity J and K for which
all ﬁrms choose $A0=
(i) The mean degree of ownership is lower with K than with J if and only if
(1  )(¯ o
K









change in average liquidity
=
(ii) The variance of the degree of ownership is lower in K than in J if and
only if the variance of liquidity is lower with K than with J=
A special case worth highlighting is that of positive, nondecreasing shocks
to each type-1’s liquidity. Note that a uniform shock in which every type 1
receives the same increase to his endowment is a special case, as is a mul-
tiplicative shock in which the percentage increase to the endowment is the
same for all 1’s. The shock will increase both the willingness to pay of the
type 1’s, which, via the internal eect, reduces the degree of integration, but
also will increase the equilibrium surplus to 2, which, via the external eect,
has the opposite impact.
However, it is a simple matter to demonstrate that in this case, the inter-
nal eect dominates: more liquidity implies less integration. For instance, if
every type 1 has % more in liquidity, the price increases by (1)% while the
average liquidity increases by % and the condition of the proposition holds
since ?1= With nondecreasing shocks, if the marginal liquidity goes up by
%> the average liquidity increases by more than % and therefore the condition
of the proposition is satisﬁed. Of course, negative, nonincreasing shocks yield
the opposite changes in surplus and organization.
20Corollary 8 Under positive, nondecreasing, shocks to the liquidity distribu-
tion of type 1 the aggregate degree of integration decreases.
To maintain this conclusion, the proviso that the shocks are monotonic
can be relaxed, but not arbitrarily. Positive shocks alone are not enough,
and having more liquidity in the economy may actually imply that there is
higher overall degree of integration. Intuitively, if the positive shock hits only
a small neighborhood of the marginal type 1, the price yW
2 will increase and
the inframarginal unshocked ﬁrms will choose to integrate more in response
to the increase in yW
2=
Proposition 9 There exist ﬁrst order stochastic dominant shifts in the dis-
tribution of type-1 liquidity that lead to more integration.
For the proof, see Appendix II.
3.3 Technology and Demand Shocks
The external eect outlined in the previous section oers a propagation mech-
anism whereby local shocks that aect only a few ﬁrms initially may nev-
ertheless entail widespread reorganization. Empirically this implies that to
explain why a particular reorganization happens, there is no need to ﬁnd
a smoking gun in the form of a change within that organization: instead
the impetus for such change may originate elsewhere in the economy. The
same logic applies to other types of shocks, most prominently among them
innovating productivity shocks. These are often thought to be the basis of
large-scale reorganizations such as merger waves (Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2002).
We model a (positive) productivity or technological innovation as an in-
crease in D= This could come from an increase in the success probability
parameter > or in the output generated when there is success; it could also
be interpreted as a demand shock that raises the proﬁt U via an increase in
the product price (particularly if all ﬁrms experience an increase in D).
It is helpful (to facilitate the Marshallian analysis) to think of the tech-
nology as inhering in the type 1’s. Suppose that in the initial economy, all
21ﬁrms have the same technology; after a shock, a subset of them, an interval
[l0>l 1]> have access to a better technology (for them, ˆ DAD )= We restrict
ourselves here to considering “small” shocks in the sense that ˆ D?2@3=
Raising D modiﬁes the game that managers play given a contract $ : it
is clear from (1) and (2) that both managers obtain a larger surplus from a
given contract. Hence the feasible set expands and the type-1’s willingness
to pay also increases. What is perhaps less immediate is that there is also
more transferability within the ﬁrm.
Lemma 10 Let D be the initial productivity. After a positive productivity
shock,
(i) the feasible set expands.
(ii) For any w?3D2@8> t h ed e g r e eo fi n t e g r a t i o ns o l v i n gx1 ($>w)=0in-
creases.
(iii) there is more transferability in the sense that the slope of the frontier is
steeper in the region y2  y1 when D increases.
Proof. (i) From (4), dierentiating (1) and (2) with respect to D> shows
that for any contract ($>w)> both x1 ($>w) and x2 ($>w) are increasing in D=
(ii) Use (5). (iii) The absolute value of the slope of the frontier in the region
y2  y1is  =2 D@(2  D) which is also increasing in D=
The willingness to pay (6) depends on the technology available to the
ﬁrm; since we assume that some ﬁrms have a dierent technology, we can
make explicit the relationship between technology and willingness to pay:


























Dl = D if l@ 5 [l0>l 1]
Dl = ˆ D if l 5 [l0>l 1]=
Lemma 10(iii) implies that — for a ﬁxed equilibrium surplus for 2 — a
shocked ﬁrm integrates less since it is able to transfer surplus via $ in a
more e!cient way. Hence when the 2s’ equilibrium surplus is ﬁxed, positive
technological shocks lead to less integration in the economy.
22H o w e v e r ,L e m m a1 0 ( i i )i m p l i e st h a tw h e nt h em a r g i n a lﬁrm is shocked,
the price will increase. Since by (iii) there is more transferability with $>
liquidity has less value: the ine!ciency linked to the use of integration is lower
and integration is a better substitute to liquidity transfers. This implies that
type 1 agents ﬁnd it more expensive, in terms of liquidity, to “buy” decision
rights or reduce the degree of integration. Therefore, if the 2s’ equilibrium
surplus increases, there is a force toward more integration. Unshocked ﬁrms
certainly integrate more; for shocked ﬁrms, we show below that while they
beneﬁt internally from the technological shock, the countervailing eect of an
increase in the 2s’ equilibrium surplus dominates. The net eect is towards
more integration for all ﬁrms in the economy if the marginal ﬁrm is a shocked
ﬁrm. Other results are contained in the following proposition:
Proposition 11 (i) (Inframarginal shocks) If l0 A 1  q the shocked ﬁrms
become less integrated and the unshocked ﬁrms remain unaected
(ii) (Marginal shocks) If 1q 5 (l0>l 1) and 1q is still the marginal type 1
agent, the equilibrium price increases and all ﬁrms, shocked and unshocked,
integrate more.
(iii) (Uniform shocks) If there is a uniform shock to the technology (l0 =
0>l 1 =1 )each ﬁrm integrates more.
Thus the eect of small positive productivity shocks depends on what
part of the economy they aect. If they occur in “rich” ﬁrms (case (i)),
only the innovating ﬁrms are aected, and they become less integrated. But
innovations that occur in “poor” ﬁrms (case (ii)) may aect the whole econ-
omy, and in the opposite direction: even ﬁrms that don’t possess the new
technology become more integrated.
Proposition 11 (iii) emphasizes that, in contrast to reduced integration
after a positive uniform liquidity shock, a uniform positive productivity shock
will have the opposite eect. In this sense the external eect of productivity
shocks is more powerful than that for liquidity shocks.
If D inheres on type 1 with the same level of liquidity, and are dieren-
tiated, entry of type 2 production units will lead to a marginal relationship
that is characterized by a smaller value of D than before entry. By Lemma
2310, the price going to type 2 decreases and all previous type 2 will choose a
lower level of $= This argument can be generalized if type 1 are dierentiated
both by their liquidity endowment and their productivity D=
From (6), the willingness to pay of type 1 depends both on D and o1.T h e
market analysis can be extended by ordering the type 1 by their willingness
t op a y ,t h em a r g i n a lt y p e1b e i n gt h ea g e n th a v i n gam e a s u r eq of type 1
with larger willingness to pay. A higher willingness to pay indicates a higher
liquidity or a higher value of D but not necessarily of both. When type 1 have
dierent productivity levels, it is actually possible that units that are more
productive than the marginal unit gain control over type 2 assets. Since for a
given D and o1> the frontier is decreasing in the payo g o i n gt ot y p e1a n di n
$, entry on the downstream market has the unambiguous eect to increase
control ﬂowing to previously active type 1. This generalizes Proposition 4
obtained when type 1 are dierentiated by liquidity only.
Proposition 12 Suppose that type 1 are dierentiated by their liquidity and
technology D= Then, entry of type 2 production units will lead to more control
by original active type 1.
4I l l u s t r a t i o n s
4.1 Entry in Supplier and Product Markets: Automo-
biles
Until the 1980s, large U.S. automobile manufacturers maintained arms-length
relationships with their suppliers, usually setting speciﬁcations for parts with-
out involvement by suppliers and then awarding production contracts via
competitive bidding. By contrast, Japanese automotive ﬁrms had long em-
braced a “partnership” model with their suppliers.
Following a wave of foreign direct investment by Japanese ﬁrms in the
U.S., Chrysler started reorganizing its relationship with suppliers, eventually
involving suppliers as almost equal partners in product and process develop-
ment; other US manufacturers soon followed suit. This change in supplier
24relations has been linked (see, for instance, Dyer 1996) to the threat posed
by the entry of Japanese ﬁrms, their dominance on the market for small cars
(which was the fast growing segment given the successive oil crises), and the
comparatively greater quality of Japanese cars seemingly due to the close
cooperation with suppliers for design and development.
In terms of our model, interpret type 2 as the car manufacturers, type 1
as the suppliers, and $ as the degree of control that car manufacturers have
in their relationships with suppliers. A move from the old arms-length rela-
tionship to the partnership arrangement is characterized by a decrease in $ as
the suppliers gain control over aspects of the design and production process.
The entry of Japanese producers into the U.S. aected both the product
market, corresponding to a fall in revenue parameter U (and therefore D) for
all ﬁrms and, since the Japanese ﬁr m sr e l i e di np a r to nl o c a ls u p p l i e r s ,t oa n
outward shift of the supply of 2’s in the supplier market (that there was not
c o n c o m i t a n te n t r yi n t ot h es u p p l i e rs i d ei ss u g g e s t e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h eU S
automakers reduced the number of suppliers they dealt with as part of their
reorganization).
The change in supplier relations in the US auto industry is consistent with
our model. From Proposition 11(iii), our model predicts that the reduced
proﬁtability for the US automakers (a uniform decrease in U) leads to a
decrease in $ for all US ﬁrms. The increased competition in the supplier
m a r k e tf r o mt h eJ a p a n e s e( r i g h t w a r ds h i f ti nt h es u p p l yo f2 ’ s )w i l lh a v et h e
same eect (Proposition 4).
Observed that if one looked only at the relationship between one auto
ﬁrm (Chrysler, say) and its supplier, assuming a fall in U due to Japanese
competition would provide little guidance as to how $ would change. Indeed,
from expression (7), a decline in D implies an increase rather than a fall in $
unless yW
2 falls enough; only the full “general equilibrium” analysis provided
in Proposition 11(iii) tells us that yW
2 does fall enough to bring about the
observed decline in $=
254.2 Technological Shocks outside the Industry: Truck-
ing
In the 1980s and 1990s the trucking industry in the US experienced a shift
away from drivers who owned their own trucks toward employee drivers. This
organizational change has been attributed to various technological develop-
ments, such as the introduction of “on-board computers” (OBCs), which
oered both better monitoring of driver actions and greater ﬂexibility in dis-
patching, permitting more e!cient use of trucks (Baker and Hubbard, 2004).
By the early 2000s, the prevalence of owner operators and use of OBCs
had stabilized. But the industry has begun to shift some control (in the
form of "perks") back to drivers. Between 2004 and 2006, carriers began
oering drivers the right to travel with spouses or to outﬁtt h e i rc a b sw i t h
satellite televisions. Since drivers decide whether and when to exercise these
r i g h t s ,t h e yc o n s t i t u t ea ni n c r e a s ei nt h e i rc o n t r o l . T h eq u e s t i o ni sw h y
there has been a shift of control allocations in trucking without an apparent
technological shift.
A possible answer comes from the observation that an important alterna-
tive employment for truckers is construction, which experienced a boom in
the early 2000s. Thinking of the drivers now as the type 2’s, and construction-
cum-trucking ﬁrms as the type 1’s, the construction boom would raise D for
the construction ﬁrms (considered to be the marginal ones). By Proposition
11(ii), our model predicts a rise in $, i.e., an increase in the degree of control
enjoyed by the drivers. The evidence suggests that participants in the in-
dustry understand this perfectly well: ﬁrms perceive a “shortage” of drivers
(Nagarajan, Bander and White, 2000 — this justiﬁes thinking of drivers as
type 2’s) and both kinds of participants attribute the need to oer perks to
the boom in construction (Urbina 2006). The outside options of drivers in
trucking ﬁrms increases, leading to a rise in $> precisely as a result of the
external eect generated by the increase in D in the construction sector.
265 Discussion
If one asks the question “who gets organizational power in a market econ-
omy?,” one is tempted to answer “to the scarce goes the power.” There is a
tradition in the business sociology literature (reviewed in Rajan and Zingales
2001) which ascribes power or authority to control of a resource that is scarce
within the organization. Similar claims can be found in the economic litera-
ture (Hart and Moore, 1990; Stole and Zweibel, 1996). Our results suggest
that organizational power may emanate from scarcity outside the organiza-
tion, i.e., from market power: agents on the short side of the market, those
with the greatest wealth, or those with the highest skills will tend to get
more control than other agents. How much they get will depend in part on
the market price of partners and therefore on the distribution of resources
among all agents in the economy, not just those in the organization. And
the lesson has to be interpreted with some care: redistribution of a scarce
resource may cause the recipient to orvh power, via the external eect (think
of an increase in productivity by the marginal manager, as in Proposition
11(ii)).
As we discussed, one empirical implication of the external eect is that
it may account for organizational change that does not originate inside the
organization. While it is clear that legal or regulatory change may inﬂuence
a ﬁrm’s ownership structure, the point is that external inﬂuences on a ﬁrm’s
organization are not limited to these but may include liquidity, technolog-
ical or demand shocks in other ﬁrms or industries. We are not aware of
attempts to quantify the real-world signiﬁcance of external eects, but hope
that models such as the present one will encourage empirical investigations
in that direction.
We now discuss some other implications of the model.
5.1 Interest Rate
We have assumed that the interest rate (the rate of return on liquidity) is
exogenous and is not aected by changes in the liquidity distribution or the
technology available to ﬁrms. One can easily extend the model to allow for
27liquidity that yields a positive return though the period of production. Be-
cause liquidity in this model is used only as a means of surplus transfer,
and not as a means to purchase new assets, the eects of this can be some-
what surprising. Raising this interest rate means that liquidity transferred at
the beginning of the period has a higher value to the recipient than before:
formally, the eect is equivalent to a multiplicative positive shock on the
distribution of liquidity, and by Proposition 8, ﬁrms will integrate less if the
interest rate increases, and will integrate more if the interest rate decreases. If
liquidity transfers made in the economy aect the interest rate, then increases
in the aggregate level of liquidity, by lowering interest rates, may constitute
a force for integration above and beyond that suggested by the example in
Proposition 9. These observations suggest that the relationship between ag-
gregate liquidity and aggregate performance is unlikely to be straightforward;
whether the potentially harmful organizational consequences would counter
or even outweigh the traditional real investment responses is a question for
future research.
5.2 Product Market
If we imagine all the ﬁrms sell to a competitive product market, then the
selling price inheres in D> which we have thus far viewed as exogenous. But if
instead price is determined endogenously in the product market, then shocks
to some ﬁrms will be transmitted to the others via the product market as well
as the supplier market. In other words, more than just the very poorest ﬁrms
i nt h ee c o n o m ym a yb e“ m a r g i n a l . ”F o ri n s t a n c e ,s u p p o s et h a tan u m b e ro f
perfectly nonintegrated ﬁrms innovate. With ﬁxed prices, these ﬁrms produce
more output, but nothing further happens. With endogenous prices, the
increased output in the ﬁrst instance lowers product price; all other ﬁrms in
the economy treat this exactly like a (uniform) negative productivity shock:
they all become less integrated. Thus product market price adjustment has
ak i n do f“ a m p l i ﬁcation” eect on organizational restructuring.
Moreover, organizational decisions may aect the quantity of goods pro-
duced and therefore the product price. For instance, if U is the price of
28a single unit of output, then industry output is increasing in the degree of
integration. As discussed in Legros and Newman (2006), the fact that the
p r o d u c tm a r k e t—e v e nac o m p e t i t i v eo n e—c a nb ea ected by the internal
organization decisions of ﬁrms has implications for consumer welfare, the
regulation of corporate governance, and competition policy.
6 Appendix I: Contracting
We have deﬁned contracts by ($>w) and equal sharing of the output ex-
post. This deﬁnition could be restrictive because it ignores the following
four potential extensions.
• Contingent shares. A contract could specify state contingent revenues
{l (U)>{ l (0) to l =1 >2=
• Debt contract. Type 1 borrows E from a ﬁnancial institution in ex-
change for a repayment of G after output is realized.
• Ex-post transfers of liquidity. The total liquidity available in the ﬁrm
is O = o1 +o2. This liquidity can be transferred either ex-ante or added
to the revenue of the ﬁrm ex-post.
• Asset swapping. This is a means of eectively committing the managers
to high levels of t= This commitment is only worthwhile if productivity
is su!ciently high relative to costs, which will not be the case given our
parametric restriction. If assets are to be swapped, we can characterize
the situation via two ownership parameters # and $ : manager 1 owns
n 5 [0>1  $) and n 5 [2  #>2)> and 2 owns the other assets.
We show that our deﬁnition of contracting is without loss of generality
by introducing into the contracting model described in the text a moral
hazard element. The incentive compatibility condition associated to this
moral hazard problem will restrict the marginal revenue {l (U){l (0) to be
equal to U@2 for each agent. The result will then follows.
29A manager has the opportunity to divert revenue U in the high state
by choosing an eort h 5 [0>1] : if the state is high, with probability h
the perceived output in the ﬁrm will be U while with probability 1  h the
perceived output in the ﬁrm is 0> in which case the manager diverts a share
fU and (1  f)U is lost; if the state is low, the perceived output in the ﬁrm
will be 0 independently of h= Only one manager has the opportunity to divert
(the identity of that manager being chosen by nature).
The ex-post revenue of the ﬁrm consists of two components: the risky
component with realizations 0 and U and a non-risky component denoted by
W, typically the amount of ex-ante liquidity than is pledged (in an escrow
account) to the ﬁrm. By choosing h> the manager can “hide” U but not W=
Let {l (U) and {l(0) be the revenues to the manager if the perceived
realization of the risky component is U and 0 respectively. Then, with h =1 >
the expected revenue to the manager is s{l (U)+( 1 s){l (0)= With h =0 >
the expected revenue is s(fU+{l (0))+(1  s){l (0)= Hence h =1is optimal
when {l (U)  fU + {l (0)> or {l (U)  {l (0)  fU= Clearly if fA1@2> both
incentive compatibility constraints cannot hold. By choosing f =1 @2> we
have
{l (U)  {l (0) = U@2 (9)
as claimed. If f?1@2> there is scope for unequal marginal revenues for the
t w oa g e n t s ,b u ti ts t i l lr e m a i n st r u et h a tt h e r ei sn ol o s si na s s u m i n gt h a t
W =0and that debt contracts are weakly dominated by non-debt contracts.
Suppose that (9) holds. A contract is (($>#)>(E>G)>({1>{ 2)(w1>w 2))>
where we assume without loss of generality that only agent 1 engages in
a debt contract. Let {W
l be the state contingent revenue equal to U@2 in
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greater for both managers. We establish this result sequentially: ﬁrst by
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tract is dominated by a contract in which only part of the assets of type 1
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30Step 1. In a contract (($>#)>(E>G)>({1>{ 2)>(w1>w 2))> feasibility requires
that w1 + w2  O + E and wl  0>l=1 >2= We write w = w1 + w2 the total
liquidity ex-ante and W = O + E  w the liquidity that is pledged to the
ﬁrm. Ex-post total revenues are then W and W + U= Managers get state
contingent revenues {l (0)>{ l (U) satisfying budget balancing and limited
liability: {1 (0)+{2 (0) = W> {1 (U)+{2 (U)=W +U> {l (0)  0>{ l (U)  0=
If there is a debt contract, manager 1 has to repay min{G>{1 (0)} in state
0 and min{G>{1 (U)} in state U= Since by (9),we need {2 (U){2 (0) = U@2>
we have {1 (U)  {1 (0) = U@2> however since manager 1 has to repay the
debt, his eective marginal compensation is
{1 (U)  {1 (0)  [min{G>{1 (U)}  min{G>{1 (0)}]=
This is consistent with (9) only if min{G>{1 (U)} =m i n {G>{1 (0)}> or
if G  {1 (0)= In this case, debt is not risky; the creditor makes a non-
negative proﬁto n l yi fG  E> but then we need {1 (0)  E and there-
fore {2 (0)  O + E  w  E = O  w= It follows that the initial con-
tract (($>#)>(E>G)>({1>{ 2)>(w1>w 2)) is weakly dominated by the contract
(($>#)>(0>0)>({W
1>{ W
2)(w1 + {1 (0)>w 2 + {2 (0)))= Since
P
l=1>2 (wl + {l (0)) =
O> there is no liquidity transferred ex-post.
Step 2. Finally we show that swapping of assets is dominated by no
swapping of assets
Consider a contract (($>#)>(0>0)>({W
1>{ W
2)>(w>O  w)) consisting of a swap
o fa s s e t sa n de x - a n t et r a n s f e r s ;w ed e n o t es u c hc o n t r a c t sb y(($>#)>w)= We





(2  $  #)
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(2  $  #)
D
2











Suppose without loss of generality that wA0 and that x2 ($>#>w)  wA
x1 ($>#>w)+w; then we must have $A# =
Let $0 = $  #D@(1  D@2); since D@(1  D@2) ? 1 and $A# >
$0 A 0= Then, x1 ($0>0>w)=x1 ($>#>w) while x2 ($0>0>w)  x2 ($>#>w)=
31#(2  D  D2)@4 A 0 since D?1= By continuity there exists ˆ $?$ 0 such
that the contract ((ˆ $>0)>w) strictly Pareto dominates the contract (($>#)>w)=
If x2 ($>#>w)  w?x 1 ($>#>w)+w> a similar argument applies by decreasing
the value of # appropriately.
7A p p e n d i x I I : P r o o f s
7.1 Proof of Proposition 5
If ¯ o1 =0 > note that yW
2 = Z (0) = (1 + ) 3
8D2 and from (7), $(yW
2>o) has a
kink at o = 3
8D2 : for lower values the degree of integration is linear and
for larger values it is zero; hence $(yW
2>o) is indeed globally convex in o (we
suppress the subscript on o where there is no ambiguity).
Suppose that O? 3D2@8.L e tO =
R
o?3D2@8 ogJ(o) and ¯ O =
R
oA3D2@8 ogJ(o)=

























=0 > and since $ is globally convex, O = J(3D2@8)O+
(1  J(3D2@8)) ¯ O implies that H$ A $(yW
2>O).T h i ss h o w st h a t¯ O =0and
that the support of J is contained in [0>3D2@8]= The same argument applies
when OA 3D2@8=
7.2 Proof of Proposition 6
We know from (7) and Proposition 2 that for a given distribution J the





case we can write $(yW




D(23D),n o t et h a td@e =1= Let  = J(yW
2 3
8D2)J(o) be the measure
of ﬁrms choosing a positive $=





¯ o1 ogJ(o) be the conditional mean among ﬁrms choos-





































$0 + d¯ o1  e
¢
=
when all ﬁrms choose $A0>= q> leading to the expression in the
Lemma.




¯ o1 (o  )
2 gJ(o)
 be the variance of liquidity among the
liquidity constrained type 1, that is those that will be in ﬁrms with $A0=
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Since the degree of ownership $ is positive only if the type 1 is liquidity
constrained (o?y W
2  3
8D2), the degree of heterogeneity of ownership will
depend on the distribution among these constrained type 1 agents. When









7.3 Proof of Proposition 7














gJ(o) if and only if d¯ oK
1 eK ?d ¯ oJ
1 eJ or if (1  )
¡¯ oK




33K  J since d
e =1 =
(ii) If J = K = q> the result is immediate from Lemma 6(ii).
7.4 Proof of Proposition 9
It is enough to provide an example. Suppose that liquidity is uniformly
distributed on [0>{]> where {?3
8D2> and suppose that q =1 ; then
¯ oJ
1 = { and the inframarginal mean liquidity is J = {
2 (1 + )= Suppose
that all agents with liquidity in [0,]> where 0 ? {? {> have a liquidity
shock and their new liquidity is  while other type 1’s have the same liquidity
as before. Then the new liquidity distribution is K(o)=0for o?and
K(o)= o
{ for {  o  =
The new marginal liquidity ¯ oK
1 is > while K = {2+232{
2{ = The condition
in Proposition 7 is violated when (1  )(  {) A 232{3{2
2{ = In particular,
if ?1
2> integration increases even if every type 1 is given liquidity {=
7.5 Proof of Proposition 11
Let
 :[ 0 >1] $ [0>1]
(l)  (ˆ ~) / Z (l)  Z (ˆ ~)=
be a reordering of the indexes of type 1 managers that is consistent with the
reordering on willingness to pay induced by the shock. The marginal type 1
agent is l such that the Lebesgue measure of the set {l : Z (l)  Z (l)} is
q and the set of equilibrium ﬁrms is I = {l : (l)  (l)}=
Let yW





the equilibrium price after the shock to the technology available to agents in
[l0>l 1]=
Remark 1 Proposition 11 is concerned with situations where l =1 q=
However, note that the marginal type may not be 1  q= T h i sc a nh a p p e ni n
two cases.
34Case 1: A ﬁrst possibility is l1 ? 1  q> that is, shocked ﬁrms were not
matched in the initial economy but because Z (l1) Ay W
2 (D)> some of these
ﬁrms will be matched. In this case, the set of “new entrants” are ﬁrms with
l 5 [l>l 1] w h i l et h es e to f“ o l dﬁrms” are those with index l  n> where
n  1  q satisﬁes l1  l = n  (1  q) (hence ﬁrms l 5 [l>l 1] “replace”
ﬁrms l 5 [1  q>n])= Since Z(l) Ay W
2 (D)> t h ed e g r e eo fi n t e g r a t i o ni n
old ﬁrms increases. For new ﬁrms, the question is whether the increase in
price Z (l)  Z (1  q) is large enough to overcome the internal eect of
technology shock pushing towards less integration.
Case 2: Another possibility is 1q 5 (l0>l 1) and Z (1  q) A lim%0 Z (l1 + %)=
Then there exists nAl 1 such that Z (n)=Z (1  q)> and either l 5 (l1>n]
or l 5 [l0>1  q)= In either case, if o1 (l) is low enough, the increase in
equilibrium surplus to the 2 may be small enough that the internal eect
dominates and shocked ﬁrms integrate less.
(i) (Inframarginal shocks) If l0 A 1  q> then l =1 q and Z (l)=
yW
2 (D)> then the shocked ﬁr m sb e c o m el e s si n t e g r a t e dw h i l et h eu n s h o c k e d
ﬁrms remain unaected
This is a direct consequence of Lemma 10
(ii) (Marginal shocks) If 1  q 5 (l0>l 1) is still the marginal type 1, the
equilibrium price increases and all ﬁrms, shocked and unshocked, integrate
more.
Note that 1  q is still the marginal type if and only if Z (1  q) 
lim%0 Z (l1 + %)> for in this case, all agents lA1q have higher willingness
to pay than 1  q=
From (8), yW







and it follows that all unshocked ﬁrms [l1>1] integrate more.
If the ﬁrm 1  q did not integrate before the shock (that is chose $ =
0)>then all lA1  q ﬁrms also chose not to integrate since $ is decreasing
in the liquidity of type 1. Hence, it is immediate that an increase in D can
only lead to more integration.
Consider now the case where ﬁrm 1  q integrated before, that is chose
a contract with $A0= If l1 chose initially a contract $ =0 > there exists
35n 5 (1  q>l1) such that all ﬁrms with l?nintegrate ($A0)a n da l lﬁrms
with l  n do not integrate; ﬁrms with l  n will necessarily integrate more
after the shock. We have yW







1  q; ˆ D
´
>
and from (7), (8), for all shocked ﬁrms l 5 [1  q>n), the dierence in the
degree of integration after and before the shock is
3 ˆ D2  4¯ o1
³
2  ˆ D
´2 
3D2  4¯ o1
(2  D)
2 A 0=
(here ¯ o1 = o1 (1  q))a n da l lﬁrms integrate more as claimed.
(iii) If l0 =0and l1 =1 > the arguments for (ii) apply since 1  q is still
the marginal type 1 manager.
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